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1 Correspondence Matrix Calculation Model1
Assume that in some town there are n districts (regions), Li > 0 is the
number of residents living at the district i, and Wj > 0 is the number of residents
working at the district j. By xij (t) ≥ 0 we will denote number of residents living
at the district i and working at the district j at the moment of time t ≥ 0. Over
course of the time numbered residents (whose quantity doesn’t alter, and is equal
to N =
n∑
i=1
Li =
n∑
j=1
Wj) change their apartments (homes). And we suppsose,
that changes may happen only by the means of the exchange of the apartments,
i.e.
xij (t) ≥ 0,
n∑
j=1
xij (t) ≡ Li,
n∑
i=1
xij (t) ≡Wj , i, j = 1, . . . , n. (1)
Suppose, that at the time t ≥ 0 resident r lives in the district k and works
in the district m, and the resident l lives in the district p and works in the
district q. Then pLk,m; p,q (t) ∆t + o (∆t) - is the probability for the residents
with numbers r and l (1 ≤ r < l ≤ N) to exchange their apartments in a
period of time (t, t+ ∆t). It’s natural to consider that probability (in the unit
time) of exchanging apartments depends only on the location of the workplaces
and homes, which are exchanged. For instance, it may be considered that the
“distance” between district i and district j is cij ≥ 0, and
pLk,m; p,q (t) ≡ pL exp ( (ckm + cpq)︸ ︷︷ ︸
sum of the distances
before exchange
− (cpm + ckq)︸ ︷︷ ︸
sum of the distances
after exchange
) > 0.
Then, by the virtue of the ergodic theorem for discrete homogeneous Markov
process with finite number of states, for all {xij}n, ni=1,j=1 ∈(1) we have that
lim
t→∞P (xij (t) = xij , i, j = 1, . . . , n) =
1This section was written, based on the works [1] – [11].
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= Z−1
n, n∏
i=1,j=1
exp (−2cijxij) · (xij !)−1 def= p
(
{xij}n, ni=1, j=1
)
,
where Z is the normalizing multiplier.
Here we have the case where the final distribution, which is also a stationary
distribution, satisfies detailed balance condition:2
(xkm + 1) (xpq + 1) · pˆ · pLk,m; p,q = xpmxkqp
(
{xij}n, ni=1, j=1
)
pLp,m; k,q,
where
pˆ = p ({x11, . . . , xkm + 1, . . . , xpq + 1, . . . , xpm − 1, . . . , xkq − 1, . . . , xnn}) .
Distribution p
(
{xij}n, ni=1, j=1
)
on a set (1) is concentrated with N  1 (see
below) in a neighborhood of the most probable value
{
x∗ij
}n, n
i=1, j=1
, which is
determined as a solution of the following entropic –linear programming problem:
n, n∑
i=1, j=1
xij lnxij + 2
n, n∑
i=1, j=1
cijxij → min{xij}n, ni=1, j=1∈(1)
. (2)
Solution of this problem might be presented as
xij = exp
(−1− λLi − λWj − 2cij) ,
where Lagrange multipliers (dual variables)
{
λLi
}n
i=1
and
{
λWj
}n
j=1
are deter-
mined3 from the system of equations (1). In practice we usually have some
information about {Li,Wi}ni=1 and {cij}n, ni=1,j=1. So, when we solve (2), we find
xkm
(
{Li,Wi}ni=1 ; {cij}n, ni=1,j=1
)
If N ∼ nm, m 1 ∀i, j = 1, . . . , n→ Li,Wj ∼ m, cij = c > 0, then the dis-
tribution of the probabilities p
(
{xij}n, ni=1, j=1
)
on the set (1) is concentrated in
O (
√
m) neighborhood of the most probable value x∗ij ≈ LiWj/N ∼ m/n, i, j =
1, . . . , n. More precisely:
∃λ > 0: lim
t→∞P
(∀ i, j = 1, . . . , n→ ∣∣xij (t)/x∗ij − 1∣∣ ≤ λ/√m) ≥ 0.999
Indeed, let us note, that
∀ {xij}n, ni=1, j=1 ∈ (1)→
n, n∑
i=1, j=1
∂ ln p
({
x∗ij
}n, n
i=1, j=1
)
∂xij
· (xij − x∗ij) ≤ 0
2 Multipliers before probabilities, for example, in the state {xij}n, ni=1, j=1, arise because of
the number of the ways to choose the resident, living in the district p and working in the
district m, is xpm, and independently the number of ways to choose the resident, living in the
district k and working in the district q, is xkq .
3 This can be done in a different ways. For example, by Bregman’s balancing method or by
Newton’s method [5]. The other way is to solve the dual problem for the entropy programming
problem (2). There are a lot of different algorithms with the first order oracle (MART, GISM,
etc. [4], [5]). It can be shown that most of this methods (including Bregman’s) are just
barrier-multiplicative antigradient descending methods [11]. At the end (when the iteration
process is achieving a sufficient small vicinity of the global minimum) it is worth to use the
second order interior-point method, like Nesterov–Nemirovskii polynomial algorithm [12] (for
so-called “separable” tasks).
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Thus, ∀ {xij}n, ni=1, j=1 ∈ (1) ∃ θ ∈ [0, 1] :
ln p
(
{xij}n, ni=1, j=1
)
≤ ln p
({
x∗ij
}n, n
i=1, j=1
)
+
+
n, n∑
i=1, j=1
∂2 ln p
({
x∗ijθ + xij · (1− θ)
}n, n
i=1, j=1
)
∂x2ij
·
(
xij − x∗ij
)2
2
Since
∂2 ln p
(
{xij}n, ni=1, j=1
)
∂x2ij
=
∂2
(
−
n, n∑
i=1, j=1
xij ln xij
)
∂x2ij
= − 1
xij
we have “inequality of measure concentration”:
∀ M > 0, ∀ {xij}n, ni=1, j=1 ∈ (1) :
n, n∑
i=1, j=1
(
xij − x∗ij
)2
2 max
{
xij , x∗ij
} ≥M
p
(
{xij}n, ni=1, j=1
)
≤ e−Mp
({
x∗ij
}n, n
i=1, j=1
)
2 Beckmann traffic flow distribution model4
Let us consider the oriented graph Γ = (V,E), which stands for transporta-
tion route in some town (V – nodes (vertices), E ⊂ V × V – arc of the net-
work (edges)). Let W = {w = (i, j) : i, j ∈ V } be a set of pairs inlet-outlet;
p = {v1, v2, . . . , vm} – route from v1 to vm, if (vk, vk+1) ∈ E, k = 1, . . . ,m − 1
(it will be shown later (see example by V.I. Shvetsov) that, to specify the path it
may not be enough to indicate only the set of vertices. In general, one must also
specify exactly which edge, connecting the specified vertices, is chosen); Pw –
set of routes in correspondence w ∈W ; P = ⋃w∈W Pw – collection of all routes
in the network Γ; xp – flux on the way p, ~x = {xp : p ∈ P}; Gp (~x) – specific
costs of travel on the road p, ~G (~x) = {Gp (~x) : p ∈ P}; ye – flux on the arc e:
~y = Θ~x, where Θ = {δep}e∈E,p∈P (δep = {1, e ∈ p; 0, e /∈ p}); τe (ye) – specific
costs of travel on the arc e (generally increasing, convex, smooth functions), it
is natural to assume, that ~G (~x) = ΘT~τ (~y). Let flows on correspondences dw,
w ∈W to be known. Then ~x, which describes flow distribution, must lie in the
set:
X =
~x ≥ 0: ∑
p∈Pw
xp = dw, w ∈W
 .
Consider a game in which each element w ∈ W corresponds to a considerably
big (dw  1) set of players of the same type. The set of pure strategies of
such player is Pw, and profit (minus losses) is defined by the formula −Gp (~x)
(a player chooses a strategy p ∈ Pw and neglects the fact, that |Pw| components
of the vector ~x and hence the profit depends slightly on his choice). One can
4This section was written, based on the works [13] – [24].
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show, that Nash equilibrium is equivalent to complementarity problem, which
equivalent to a solution of variation inequality, which, in its turn equivalent to
a solution of convex optimization problem.
∀w ∈W, p ∈ Pw → x∗p ·
(
Gp (~x
∗)− min
q∈Pw
Gq (~x
∗)
)
= 0
m
∀~x ∈ X →
〈
~G (~x∗) , ~x− ~x∗
〉
≥ 0
m
Ψ (~x) =
∑
e∈E
∑
p∈P xpδpe∫
0
τe (z) dz → min
~x∈X
. (3)
It is easy to show, that in the case ~G (~x) being strictly monotonic transformation,
the Nash-Vardrop equilibrium ~x∗ is unique. If τe (ye) are increasing functions
then ~y∗ = Θ~x∗ is unique, although, as we will see later, ~x∗ isn’t necessarily
unique.
The route at a step (n+ 1) player at correspondence w, choose independently
according the mixed strategy with probability
Probwp (n+ 1) = γn ·max
{
xp (n) , n
−1} exp (−Gp (~x (n))/T )/Zwn , w ∈W,
to choose path p ∈ Pw (0 < γn ≤ 1), and with probability 1 − γn to choose
the same strategy as at the n-th step. Here xp (n) – number of players at w,
who have chosen at the n-th step strategy p ∈ Pw, and Zwn can be found from
the normalization condition. Multiplier max
{
xp (n) , n
−1} describes the will to
imitate and, also, the reliability of using this strategy. This multiplier notices
specifics of the problem (without it there could be convergence to something
different from the Nash-Wardrop equilibrium). Parameter γ describes “the con-
servatism”, while “the temperature” T stands for “the risk appetite”.
Theorem 1 Let T > 0 be sufficiently small,
∞∑
n=1
γn =∞,
∞∑
n=1
(γn)
2
<∞. Then
Ψ (~x (n))
a.s.−→
n→∞ Ψ (~x
∗), where ~x∗ is the minimizer from (3). Moreover, if the
equilibrium is unique, then ~x (n)
a.s.−→
n→∞ ~x
∗.
In the experiments, conducted at the Laboratory of Experimental Economics
in the Faculty of Applied Mathematics and Control, MIPT, in which students
of the 5th course were involved, we observed the convergence to equilibrium and
“vibrations” around it. Fluctuations should be explained, apparently, by the
fact that in experiments the number of players was small and the hypothesis of
a competitive market was not performed. We also observed, that for students
γn ≡ γ > 0 it is more likely, than γn ∼ 1/n. As a result there will be convergence
not to the equilibrium point, but to its neighborhood. Size of the neighborhood
depends on T , γ > 0 and the number of players.
Example 1 (Braess paradox, 1968 [15]) Let correspondence x14 = 6
thousand cars/hour (see graphs on Figures 1 and 2). Weight of the edges is time
4
Figure 1: Case 1. x124 = x134 = 3. Total time for each path is T = 83 min.
Figure 2: Case 2. x124 = x1234 = x134 = 2. Total time for each path is T = 92 min.
delay (in minutes) when the flow on the edge is yij (thousand cars/hour). For
example, in case 2 (see Figure 2): y24 = x1324 + x124. It is natural that time
delay (at each of the edge) is a growth function of flow.
The following example shows, that under the very natural conditions vector-
function of cost of the travel ~G (~x) can’t be strictly monotone:
∃~x, ~y ∈ X (~x 6= ~y) : ~G (~x) = ~G (~y)⇒
〈
~G (~x)− ~G (~y) , ~x− ~y
〉
= 0.
This, for example, can be because of
~G (~x) = ΘT~τ (~y) , ~y = Θ~x,
where ~y = {ye}e∈E describes the loading of edges (arcs) of a graph of the
transport network, ~τ (~y) = {τe (ye)}e∈E – vector-function of cost of the travel
on the edges of transport network, Θ – incidence matrix of edges and paths,
and different vectors of flow distributions ~x may correspond to the same vector
~y = Θ~x.
Example 2 (Nonuniqueness of the equilibrium; Shvetsov, 2010).
On Figure 3 the equilibrium flow distribution is shown, for all x ∈ [0, 0.5].
Figure 3: Nonuniqueness of the equilibrium.
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Theorem 2 Let T > 0 be sufficiently small,
∞∑
n=1
γn =∞,
∞∑
n=1
(γn)
2
<∞. Then
Ψ (~x (n))
a.s.−→
n→∞ Ψ (~x
∗) and ~x (n) a.s.−→
n→∞ ~x
∗ (~x (0)) . Note most of the elements of
~x∗ (~x (0)) can be equal to zero.
We should notice, that Theorem 2 is a refutation (in case of the considered
dynamics) of the hypothesis [16]. It states that in the case of non-unique Nash-
Wardrop equilibrium, the equilibrium is more likely to realize, and it is a solution
of the following linear-enthropy programming problem∑
w∈W
∑
p∈Pw
(xp ln (xp/|Pw|)− xp)→ min
~x∈X, Θ~x=~y∗
,
where ~y∗ – is the unique solution of V (~y) =
∑
e∈E
ye∫
0
τe (z) dz → min~y=Θ~x, ~x∈X .
3 Sketch of the proof of the Theorem 1
Lemma 1 Let f (w) = −T lnw, where w ∈ (0, 1). αi > 0 — are some ran-
domly chosen, but fixed parameters; wi ∈ (0, 1). Let us consider functions
F0 (~w) =
∑
i
αiwif (wi)∑
i
αiwi
, and F1 (~w) =
∑
i
αif (wi)∑
i
αi
.
Then F0 (~w) ≤ F1 (~w), and the equality is attained only when
w1 = w2 = . . . = w
∗.
Proof.
The proof is based on the consequent usage of the inequality between harmonic
mean and geometric mean and then Cauchy inequality. 
Lemma 2 For any ~x (n) ∈ X : ~x (n) 6= ~x∗ holds the following inequality
〈gradΨ (~x(n)) , E [~x(n+ 1)− ~x (n)| ~x (n)]〉 =
=
〈
~G (~x(n)) , E [~x(n+ 1)− ~x(n)| ~x (n)]
〉
< 0. (4)
Proof.
Without restricting the generality, we can assume that ∀ p ∈ P → xp (n) ≥ 1.
Then 〈
~G (~x (n)) , E [~x (n+ 1)− ~x (n)| ~x (n)]
〉
=
= γn
∑
w∈W
dw

∑
p∈Pw
xp (n)Gp (~x (n)) exp
(
−Gp(~x(n))
T
)
∑
p∈Pw
xp (n) exp
(
−Gp(~x(n))
T
) −
∑
p∈Pw
Gp (~x (n))xp (n)∑
p∈Pw
xp (n)
.
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From Lemma 1 it follows that〈
~G (~x (n)) , E [~x (n+ 1)− ~x (n)| ~x (n)]
〉
≤ 0.
And the equality can be attained only on the equilibrium vector ~x∗, which can
not be under considered hypothesis. 
Remark 1 Lemma 2 can be more specified. At some neighborhood of the equi-
librium there exists l > 0, such that〈
~G (~x (n)) , E [~x (n+ 1)− ~x (n)| ~x (n)]
〉
≤ −lγn · (Ψ (~x (n))−Ψ (~x∗)) .
Also, with some reserves, we can change constraint ~x (n) ∈ X to ~x (n) ≥ ~0.
Lemma 3 ([25], Chapter 2.2) Let
∞∑
n=1
γn =∞,
∞∑
n=1
(γn)
2
<∞.
Then
Ψ (~x (n))
a.s.−→
n→∞ Ψ (~x
∗)
and if the equilibrium is unique, then also
~x (n)
a.s.−→
n→∞ ~x
∗.
Proof.
Lemma 2 and Theorem 1 from chapter 2.2 of [25] allow us to consider only the
situation, when ~x (n) is close to ~x∗. Then by Taylor formula we have:
E [Ψ (~x (n+ 1))| ~x (n)] = Ψ (~x(n)) +
+ 〈grad Ψ (~x (n)) , E [~x (n+ 1)− ~x (n)| ~x (n)]〉+ O
(
(γn)
2
)
.
If we take mathematical expectations from both sides of this equality, we
will get that there exists sufficiently large C > 0, such that
E (Ψ (~x (n+ 1)))−Ψ (~x∗) ≤ (1− lγn) · (E (Ψ (~x (n)))−Ψ (~x∗)) + C · (γn)2 .
From more general statement from [25] we get that
E (Ψ (~x (n)))−Ψ (~x∗) −→
n→∞ 0,
if ∞∑
n=1
γn =∞,
∞∑
n=1
(γn)
2
<∞.
From Kolmogorov inequality follows
P (∀ n ≥ n0 → Ψ (~x (n))−Ψ (~x∗) ≤ ε) ≥
≥ 1− ε−1 ·
(
E (Ψ (~x (n0))−Ψ (~x∗)) +
∞∑
k=n0
(γk)
2
)
.
Which concludes the proof. 
In the end we will formulate a known result, which is in high correlation with
the proved one.
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Theorem 3 Let5 T > 0. Then there ∃C,α > 0: ∀ N ∈ N
P
(
Ψ
(
1
N
N∑
n=1
~x (n)
)
−Ψmin ≥ Ω√
N
)
≤ 2 exp (−C · Ω) ,
where γ = α√
N
Authors thank S.A. Avvakumov, I.B. Gnedkov, Y.V. Dorn, I.S. Menshikov,
E.A. Nurminskiy, A.A. Shananin, V.I. Shvetsov and especially A.V. Gasnikov.
The work was supported by RFBR 10-01-00321-a, 11-01-00494-a 11-07-
00162-a. The second author is partially supported by the Laboratory for Struc-
tural Methods of Data Analysis in Predictive Modeling, MIPT, RF government
grant, ag. 11.G34.31.0073
References
[1] Introduction to the mathematical modeling of traffic flow / Gasnikov A.V.,
Klenov S.L., Nurminskiy E.A., Kholodov Y.A., Shamray N.B.; with ap-
pendices M.L. Blank, E.V. Gasnikova, A.A. Zamyatin and V.A. Malyshev,
A.V. Kolesnikov, A.M. Raigorodskiy, ed. A.V. Gasnikov. M.: MIPT, 2010.
361 p. (in Russian) http://zoneos.com/traffic/
[2] Wilson A.G. (1970) Entropy in urban and regional modeling. Pion ltd.,
London.
[3] Jaynes E.T. (1989) Papers on probability, statistics and statistical physics.
Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publisher.
[4] Popkov Yu.S. (1995) Macrosystems. Theory and its applications. Springer-
Verlag.
[5] Fang S.-C., Rajasekera J.R., Tsao H.-S. (1997) Entropy optimization and
mathematical programming. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
[6] Ledoux M.(2001) Concentration of measure phenomenon (2001). Provi-
dence, RI, Amer. Math. Soc., (Math. Surveys Monogr. V. 89).
[7] Weidlich W.(2005) Sociodynamics. A systematic approach to mathemati-
cal modeling in social sciences. Harwood Academic Publishers, 2005.
[8] Castellano C., Fortunato S., Loreto V.(2009) Statistical physics of so-
cial behavior // Review of modern physics, V. 81. 2009. P. 591-646.
arXiv:0710.3256v2
[9] Batishcheva Ya.G., Vedenyapin V.V. (2005) The second law of thermody-
namics for chemical kinetics // Mat. Model., V. 17. 8. 2005. P. 106-110.
(in Russian)
[10] Malyshev V.A., Pirogov S.A. (2008) Reversibility and irreversibility in
stochastic chemical kinetics // Uspekhi Mat. Nauk, V. 63. 1(379). 2008.
P. 3-36.
5See formula (2.32), statement 2.2 and example on the page 1586 in [26]
8
[11] Gasnikova E.V. (2009) Dual multiplicative algorithms for a problem of
entropy-linear programming // Zh. Vychisl. Mat. Mat. Fiz., V. 49. . 3.
2009. P. 453-464.
[12] Nesterov Yu., Nemirovskii A. (1985) Interior-point polynomial algorithms
in convex programming. Philadelphia: SIAM, 1994.
[13] Sheffi Y.(1985) Urban transportation networks: Equilibrium analysis with
mathematical programming methods. N.J.: Prentice–Hall Inc., Englewood
Cliffs, 1985.
[14] Patriksson M. (1994) The traffic assignment problem. Models and meth-
ods. Utrecht Netherlands: VSP, 1994.
[15] Steenbrink P.A. (1974) Optimization of transport networks. John Wiley &
Sons 1974
[16] Bar-Gera H. (1999) Origin-based algorithms for transportation network
modeling. Univ. of Illinois at Chicago, 1999.
[17] Foster D., Young P. (1990) Stochastic evolutionary game dynamics //
Theoretical population biology. 1990. V. 38. 2.
[18] Cressman R. (2003) Evolutionary game theory and extensive form games.
Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2003.
[19] Hofbauer J., Sigmund K. (2003) Evolutionary game dynamics // Bulletin
of the AMS. 2003. V. 40. 4. P. 479–519.
[20] McKelvey R. D., Palfrey T. R. (1998) Quantal response equilibria for ex-
tensive form games // Experimental economics. 1998. V. 1. P. 9–41.
[21] Marsili M. (2001) Toy models of markets with heterogeneous interacting
agents // e-print www.unifr.ch/econophysics/, 2001.
[22] Fogel D. (2000) B. Evolutionary Computation: Towards a New Philosophy
of Machine Intelligence. New York: IEEE Press, 2000.
[23] Como G., Salva K., Acemoglu D., Dahleh M.A., Frazzoli E. (2011) Stability
analysis of transportation networks with multiscale driver decisions // e-
print arXiv:1101.2220v1.
[24] Nesterov Yu. De Palma A. (2003) Stationary dynamic solutions in con-
gested transportation networks: summary and perspectives // Networks
and Spatial Economics, V. 3. 2003. P. 371-395.
[25] Polyak B.T. (1987) Introduction to Optimization. Optimization Software
Inc., 1987.
[26] Juditsky A., Lan G., Nemirovskii A., Shapiro A. (2009) Stochas-
tic approximation approach to stochastic programming //
SIAM Journal on Optimization, 2009. V. 19. 4. P. 1574–1609.
http://www2.isye.gatech.edu/∼nemirovs/
9
